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Abstract—Adversarial examples have raised questions regard-
ing the robustness and security of deep neural networks. In this
work we formalize the problem of adversarial images given a
pretrained classifier, showing that even in the linear case the
resulting optimization problem is nonconvex. We generate adver-
sarial images using shallow and deep classifiers on the MNIST
and ImageNet datasets. We probe the pixel space of adversarial
images using noise of varying intensity and distribution. We bring
novel visualizations that showcase the phenomenon and its high
variability. We show that adversarial images appear in large
regions in the pixel space, but that, for the same task, a shallow
classifier seems more robust to adversarial images than a deep
convolutional network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Small but purposeful pixel distortions can easily fool the
best deep convolutional networks for image classification [1],
[2]. The small distortions are hardly visible by humans, but
still can mislead most neural networks. Adversarial images
can even fool the internal representation of images by neural
networks [3]. That problem has divided the Machine Learning
community, with some hailing it as a “deep flaw” of deep
neural networks [4]; and others promoting a more cautious
interpretation, and showing, for example, that most classifiers
are susceptible to adversarial examples [5], [6].
The distortions were originally obtained via an optimization
procedure, [1], but it was subsequently shown that adversarial
images could be generated using a simple gradient calculation
[5] or using evolutionary algorithms [2].
Despite the controversy, adversarial images surely suggest
a lack of robustness, since they are (for humans) essentially
equal to correctly classified images. Immunizing a network
against those perturbations increases its ability to generalize,
a form of regularization [5] whose statistical nature deserves
further investigation. Even the traditional backpropagation
training procedure can be improved with adversarial gradient
[7]. Recent work shows that it is possible for the training
procedure to make classifiers robust to adversarial examples
by using a strong adversary [8] or defensive distillation [9].
In this paper, we extend previous works on adversarial
images for deep neural networks [1], by exploring the pixel
space of such images using random perturbations. That frame-
work (Figure 1) allows us to ask interesting questions about
adversarial images. Initial skepticism about the relevance of
adversarial images suggested they existed as isolated points
in the pixel space, reachable only by a guided procedure
with complete access to the model. More recent works [5],
[10] claim that they inhabit large and contiguous regions in
the space. The correct answer has practical implications: if
adversarial images are isolated or inhabit very thin pockets,
they deserve much less worry than if they form large, compact
regions. In this work we intend to shed light to the issue with
an in-depth analysis of adversarial image space.
a	  
Fig. 1. Fixed-sized images occupy a high-dimensional space spanned by their
pixels (one pixel = one dimension), here depicted as a 2D colormap. Left:
classifiers associate points of the input pixel space to output class labels, here
‘banana’ (blue) and ‘mushroom’ (red). From a correctly classified original
image (a), an optimization procedure (dashed arrows) can find adversarial
examples that are, for humans, essentially equal to the original, but that will
fool the classifier. Right: we probe the pixel space by taking a departing
image (white diamond), adding random noise to it (black stars), and asking
the classifier for the label. In compact, stable regions, the classifier will be
consistent (even if wrong). In isolated, unstable regions, as depicted, the
classifier will be erratic.
II. CREATING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
Assume we have a pre-trained classifier p = f(X) that, for
each input X ∈ I, corresponding to the pixels of a fixed-sized
image, outputs a vector of probabilities p = [p1 · · · pi · · · pn]
of the image belonging to the class label i. We can assign
h to the label corresponding to the highest probability ph.
Assume further that I = [L − U ], for grayscale images, or
I = [L−U ]3 for RGB images, where L and U are the lower
and upper limits of the pixel scale.
Assume that c is the correct label and that we start with
h = c, otherwise there is no point in fooling the classifier.
We want to add the smallest distortion D to X , such that
the highest probability will no longer be assigned to h. The
distortions must keep the input inside its space, i.e., we must
ensure that X + D ∈ I. In other words, the input is box-
constrained. Thus, we have the following optimization:c©2016 IEEE – Manuscript accepted at IJCNN 2016
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minimize
D
‖D‖
subject to L ≤ X +D ≤ U
p = f(X +D)
max(p1 − pc, ..., pn − pc) > 0
(1)
That formulation is more general than the one presented
by [1], for it ignores non-essential details, such as the choice
of the adversarial label. It also showcases the non-convexity:
since max(x) < 0 is convex, the inequality is clearly concave
[11], making the problem non-trivial even if the model p =
f(X) were linear in X . Deep networks, of course, exacerbate
the non-convexity due to their highly non-linear model. For ex-
ample, a simple multi-layer perceptron for binary classification
could have f(X) = logit−1(W2 · tanh(W1 · X + b1) + b2),
which is neither convex nor concave due to the hyperbolic
tangent.
A. Procedure
Training a classifier usually means minimizing the clas-
sification error by changing the model weights. To generate
adversarial images, however, we hold the weights fixed, and
find the minimal distortion that still fools the network.
We can simplify the optimization problem of eq. 1 by
exchanging the max inequality for a term in the loss function
that measures how adversarial the probability output is:
minimize
D
‖D‖+ C ·H(p, pA)
subject to L ≤ X +D ≤ U
p = f(X +D)
(2)
where we introduce the adversarial probability target pA =
[1i=a], which assigns zero probability to all but a chosen
adversarial label a. That formulation is essentially the same
of [1], picking an explicit (but arbitrary) adversary label. We
stipulate the loss function: the cross-entropy (H) between the
probability assignments; while [1] keep that choice open.
The constant C balances the importance of the two ob-
jectives. The lower the constant, the more we will minimize
the distortion norm. Values too low, however, may turn the
optimization unfeasible. We want the lowest, but still feasible,
value for C.
We can solve the new formulation with any local search
compatible with box-constraints. Since the optimization vari-
ables are the pixel distortions, the problem size is exactly
the size of the network input, which in our case varies from
28×28 = 784 for MNIST [12] to 221×221×3 = 146 523 for
OverFeat [13]. In contrast to current neural network training,
that reaches hundreds of millions of weights, those sizes
are small enough to allow second-order procedures, which
converge faster and with better guarantees [14]. We chose L-
BFGS-B, a box-constrained version of the popular L-BFGS
second-order optimizer [15]. We set the number of corrections
in the limited-memory matrix to 15, and the maximum number
of iterations to 150. We used Torch7 to model the networks and
extract their gradient with respect to the inputs [16]. Finally,
we implemented a bisection search to determine the optimal
value for C [17]. The algorithm is explained in detail in the
next section.
B. Algorithm
Algorithm 1 implements the optimization procedure used
to find the adversarial images. The algorithm is essentially a
bisection search for the constant C, where in each step we
solve a problem equivalent to Eq. 2. Bisection requires initial
lower and upper bounds for C, such that the upper bound
succeeds in finding an adversarial image, and the lower bound
fails. It will then search the transition point from failure to
success (the “zero” in a root-finding sense): that will be the
best C. We can use C = 0 as lower bound, as it always leads
to failure (the distortion will go to zero). To find an upper
bound leading to success, we start from a very low value, and
exponentially increase it until we succeed. During the search
for the optimal C we use warm-starting in L-BFGS-B to speed
up convergence: the previous optimal value found for D is
used as initial value for the next attempt.
To achieve the general formalism of eq. 1 we would have
to find the adversarial label leading to minimal distortion.
However, in datasets like ImageNet [18], with hundreds of
classes, this search would be too costly. Instead, in our
experiments, we opt to consider the adversarial label as one of
the sources of random variability. As we will show, this does
not upset the analyses.
The source code for adversarial image generation and pixel
space analysis can be found in https://github.com/tabacof/
adversarial.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial image generation algorithm
Require: A small positive value 
Ensure: L-BFGS-B(X, pA, C) solves optimization 2
1: {Finding initial C}
2: C ← 
3: repeat
4: C ← 2× C
5: D, p← L-BFGS-B(X, pA, C)
6: until max(pi) in p is pa
7: {Bisection search}
8: Clow ← 0, Chigh ← C
9: repeat
10: Chalf ← (Chigh + Clow)/2
11: D′, p← L-BFGS-B(X, pA, Chalf )
12: if max(pi) in p is pa then
13: D ← D′
14: Chigh ← Chalf
15: else
16: Clow ← Chalf
17: end if
18: until (Chigh − Clow) < 
19: return D
(a) MNIST with logistic regression. The correct labels are self-evident.
(b) MNIST with convolutional network. The correct labels are self-evident.
(c) OverFeat on ImageNet. From left to right, correct labels: ‘Abaya’, ‘Ambulance’, ‘Banana’, ‘Kit Fox’, ‘Volcano’. Adversarial labels
for all: ‘Bolete’ (a type of mushroom).
Fig. 2. Adversarial examples for each network. For all experiments: original images on the top row, adversarial images on the bottom row, distortions
(difference between original and adversarial images) on the middle row.
III. ADVERSARIAL SPACE EXPLORATION
In this section we explore the vector space spanned by the
pixels of the images to investigate the “geometry” of adversar-
ial images: are they isolated, or do they exist in dense, compact
regions? Most researchers currently believe that images of
a certain appearance (and even meaning) are contained into
relatively low-dimensional manifolds inside the whole space
[19]. However, those manifolds are exceedingly convoluted,
discouraging direct geometric approaches to investigate the
pixel space.
Thus, our approach is indirect, probing the space around
the images with small random perturbations. In regions where
the manifold is nice — round, compact, occupying most of
the space — the classifier will be consistent (even if wrong).
In the regions where the manifold is problematic — sparse,
discontinuous, occupying small fluctuating subspaces — the
classifier will be erratic.
A. Datasets and models
To allow comparison with the results of [1], we employ the
MNIST handwritten digits database (10 classes, 60k training
and 10k testing images), and the 2012 ImageNet Large Visual
Recognition Challenge Dataset (1000 classes, 1.2M+ training
and 150k testing images).
For MNIST, [1] tested convolutional networks and autoen-
coders. We employ both convolutional networks and a logistic
linear classifier. While logistic classifiers have limited accuracy
(∼7.5% error), their training procedure is convex [11]. They
also allowed us to complement the original results [1] by
investigating adversarial images in a shallow classifier.
The convolutional network we employed for
MNIST/ConvNet consisted of two convolutional layers
with 64 and 128 5×5 filters, two 2×2 max-pooling layers
after the convolutional layers, one fully-connected layer with
256 units, and a softmax layer as output. We used ReLU for
nonlinearity, and 0.5 dropout before the two last layers. The
network was trained with SGD and momentum. Without data
augmentation, this model achieves 0.8% error on the test set.
For ImageNet, we used the pre-trained OverFeat network
[13], which achieved 4th place at the ImageNet competition
in 2013, with 14.2% top-5 error in the classification task, and
won the localization competition the same year. [1] employed
AlexNet [20], which achieved 1st place at the ImageNet
competition in 2012, with 15.3% top-5 error.
On each dataset, we preprocess the inputs by standardizing
each pixel with the global mean and standard deviation of all
pixels in the training set images.
Figure 2 illustrates all three cases. Original and adversarial
images are virtually indistinguishable. The pixel differences
(middle row) do not show any obvious form — although a faint
“erasing-and-rewriting” effect can be observed for MNIST.
Figures 2a and 2b also suggest that the MNIST classifiers are
more robust to adversarial images, since the distortions are
larger and more visible. We will see, throughout the paper,
that classifiers for MNIST and for ImageNet have important
differences in how they react to adversarial images.
B. Methods
Each case (MNIST/Logistic, MNIST/ConvNet,
ImageNet/OverFeat) was investigated independently, by
applying the optimization procedure explained in Section II-A.
For ImageNet we sampled 5 classes (Abaya, Ambulance,
Banana, Kit Fox, and Volcano), 5 correctly classified examples
from each class, and sampled 5 adversarial labels (Schooner,
Bolete, Hook, Lemur, Safe), totaling 125 adversarial images.
For MNIST, we just sampled 125 correctly classified
examples from the 10K examples in the test set, and sampled
an adversarial label (from 9 possibilities) for each one. All
random sampling was made with uniform probability. To
sample only correctly classified examples, we rejected the
misclassified ones until we accumulated the needed amount.
We call, in the following sections, those correctly classified
images originals, since the adversarial images are created
from them.
The probing procedure consisted in picking an image pair
(an adversarial image and its original), adding varying levels
of noise to their pixels, resubmitting both to the classifier, and
observing if the newly assigned labels corresponded to the
original class, to the adversarial class, or to some other class.
We measured the levels of noise (λ) relative to the difference
between each image pair. We initially tested a Gaussian i.i.d.
model for the noise. For each image X = {xi}, our procedure
creates an image X ′ = {clamp(xi+)} where  ∼ N (µ, λσ2),
and µ and σ2 are the sample mean and variance of the
distortion pixels. In the experiments we ranged λ from 2−5
to 25. To keep the pixel values of X ′ within the original
range [L − U ] we employ clamp(x) = min(max(x, L), U).
In practice, we observed that clamping has little effect on the
noise statistics.
An i.i.d. Gaussian model discards two important attributes
of the distortions: spatial correlations, and higher-order mo-
menta. We wanted to evaluate the relative importance of those,
and thus performed an extra round of experiments that, while
still discarding all spatial correlations by keeping the noise
i.i.d., adds higher momenta information by modeling non-
parametrically the distribution of distortion pixels. Indeed,
a study of those higher momenta (Table I) suggests that
the adversarial distortions has a much heavier tail than the
Gaussians, and we wanted to investigate how that affects the
probing. The procedure is exactly the same as before, but with
 ∼ M, where M is an empirical distribution induced by a
non-parametric observation of the distortion pixels. In those
experiments we cannot control the level: the variance of the
noise is essentially the same as the variance of the distortion
pixels.
Our main metric is the fraction of images (in %) that keep or
switch labels when noise is added to a departing image, which
we use as a measure of the stability of the classifier at the
departing image in the pixel space. The fraction is computed
over a sample of 100 probes, each probe being a repetition of
the experiment with all factors held fixed but the sampling of
the random noise.
C. Results
Figure 3 shows that adversarial images do not appear
isolated. On the contrary, to completely escape the adversarial
pocket we need to add a noise with much higher variance
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Fig. 3. Adding Gaussian noise to the images. We perform the probing procedure explained in Section III-B to measure the stability of the classifier boundaries
at different points of the pixel space. To escape the adversarial pockets completely we have to add a noise considerably stronger than the original distortion
used to reach them in the first place: adversarial regions are not isolated. That is especially true for ImageNet/OverFeat. Still, the region around the correctly
classified original image is much more stable. This graph is heavily averaged: each stacked column along the horizontal axis summarizes 125 experiments ×
100 random probes.
— notice that the horizontal axis is logarithmic — than the
distortion used to reach the adversarial image in the first place.
In both networks, the original images display a remark-
able robustness against Gaussian noise (Figures 3b and 3f),
confirming that robustness to random noise does not imply
robustness to adversarial examples [6]. That shows that while
the adversarial pockets are not exactly isolated, neither are
they as well-behaved as the zones that contain the correctly
classified samples.
The results in Figure 3 are strongly averaged, each data
point summarizing, for a given level of noise, the result of
125 experiments: the fraction of images that fall in each label
for all five original class labels, all five original samples from
each label, and all five adversarial class labels. In reality there
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Fig. 4. Adding Gaussian noise to the images. Another view of the probing procedure explained in Section III-B. Contrarily to the averaged view of Figure 3,
here each one of the 125 experiments appears as an independent curve along the Experiments axis (their order is arbitrary, chosen to reduce occlusions). Each
point of the curve is the fraction of probes (out of a hundred performed) that keeps their class label.
is a lot of variability that can be better appreciated in Figure 4.
Here each curve alongside the axis experiments represents
a single choice of original class label, original sample, and
adversarial class label, thus there are 125 curves. (The order of
the curves along this axis is arbitrary and chosen to minimize
occlusions and make the visualization easier). The graphs
show that depending on a specific configuration, the label may
be very stable and hard to switch (curves that fall later or do
not fall at all), or very unstable (curves that fall early). Those
3D graphs also reinforce the point about the stability of the
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(b) MNIST / convolutional network
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Fig. 5. For each of the 125 experiments we measure the fraction of the probe images (i.e., departing image + random noise) that stayed in the same class
label. Those fractions are then sorted from biggest to lowest along the Experiments axis. The area under the curves indicates the entire fraction of probes
among all experiments that stayed in the same class.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE ADVERSARIAL DISTORTIONS FOR THE
TWO DATASETS AVERAGED OVER THE 125 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES.
PIXELS VALUES IN [0− 255]. LOGISTIC AND CONVNET REFER TO
MNIST DATASET, OVERFEAT REFERS TO IMAGENET DATASET.
Mean S.D. Skewness Ex. Kurtosis
Logistic 30.7± 4.3 18.3± 11.3 0.1± 1.0 7.8± 3.2
ConvNet 27.5± 2.1 23.0± 9.4 −0.5± 1.6 17.6± 7.3
OverFeat 118.4± 0.1 1.9± 2.0 0.0± 0.1 6.5± 4.1
correctly classified original images.
The results suggest that the classifiers for MNIST are more
resilient against adversarial images than ImageNet/OverFeat.
Moreover, the shallow MNIST/logistic behaves differently
than the deep MNIST/ConvNet, as shown by the the “falling
columns” in Figure 3: initially, a small push in MNIST/logistic
throws a larger fraction of the adversarial examples back to the
correct space. However, at large noise levels, MNIST/logistc
saturates with a larger fraction of images still adversarial than
MNIST/ConvNet.
Finally, we wanted to investigate how the nature of the
noise added affected the experiments. Recall that our i.i.d.
Gaussian noise differs from the original optimized distortion
in two important aspects: no spatial correlations, and no
important higher-order momenta. To explore the influence of
those two aspects, we introduced a noise modeled after the
empirical distribution of the distortion pixels. This still ignores
spatial correlations, but captures higher-order momenta. The
statistics of the distortion pixels are summarized in Table I, and
reveal a distribution that is considerably heavier-tailed than the
Gaussians we have employed so far.
Figure 5 contrasts the effect of this noise modeled non-
parametrically after the distortions with the effect of the
comparable Gaussian noise (λ = 1). Each point in the curves is
one of the 125 experiments, and represents the fraction of the
100 probe images that stays in the same class as the departing
— adversarial or original — image. The experiments where
ordered by this value in each curve (thus the order of the
experiments in the curves is not necessarily the same). Here
the individual experiments are not important, but the shape of
the curves: how early and how quickly they fall.
For ImageNet, the curves for the non-parametric noise
(dotted lines) fall before the curves for the Gaussian noise
(continuous line), showing that, indeed, the heavier tailed noise
affects the images more, even without the spatial correlation.
In addition, all curves fall rather sharply. This shows that in
almost all experiments, either all probes stay in the same label
as the original, or all of them switch. Few experiments present
intermediate results. This rather bimodal behavior was already
present in the curves of Figure 4.
For MNIST, again, the effect is different: Gaussian and
heavy-tail noises behave much more similarly and the curves
fall much more smoothly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our in-depth analysis reinforces previous claims found in
the literature [5], [10]: adversarial images are not necessarily
isolated, spurious points: many of them inhabit relatively
dense regions of the pixel space. This helps to explain why
adversarial images tend to stay adversarial across classifiers
of different architectures, or trained on different sets [1]:
slightly different classification boundaries stay confounded by
the dense adversarial regions.
The nature of the noise affects the resilience of both
adversarial and original images. The effect is clear in Ima-
geNet/OverFeat, where a Gaussian noise affects the images
less than a heavy-tailed noise modeled after the empirical
distribution of the distortions used to reach the adversarial
images in the first place. An important next step in the
exploration, in our view, is to understand the spatial nature
of the adversarial distortions, i.e., the role spatial correlations
play.
Recent works have attributed susceptibility to adversarial
attacks to the linearity in the network [5], but our exper-
iments suggest the phenomenon may be more complex. A
weak, shallow, and relatively more linear classifier (logistic
regression), seems no more susceptible to adversarial images
than a strong, deep classifier (deep convolutional network), for
the same task (MNIST). A strong deep model on a complex
task seems to be more susceptible. Are adversarial images
an inevitable Achilles’ heel of powerful complex classifiers?
Speculative analogies with the illusions of the Human Visual
System are tempting, but the most honest answer is that we
still know too little. Our hope is that this article will keep
the conversation about adversarial images ongoing and help
further explore those intriguing properties.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Micael Carvalho for his helpful hints
and revision; Jonghoon Jin for open access to his OverFeat
wrapper1; and Soumith Chintala, and the rest of the Torch7
team for all of their help on the mailing list. We thank the
Brazilian agencies CAPES, CNPq and FAPESP for financial
support.
1https://github.com/jhjin/overfeat-torch
REFERENCES
[1] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[2] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.1897, 2014.
[3] S. Sabour, Y. Cao, F. Faghri, and D. J. Fleet, “Adversarial manipulation
of deep representations,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05122, 2015.
[4] R. Bi, “Does deep learning have deep flaws?” http://www.kdnuggets.
com/2014/06/deep-learning-deep-flaws.html, 2014, accessed: 2015-09-
08.
[5] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[6] A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Analysis of classifiers’ robustness
to adversarial perturbations,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.02590, 2015.
[7] A. Nøkland, “Improving back-propagation by adding an adversarial
gradient,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.04189, 2015.
[8] R. Huang, B. Xu, D. Schuurmans, and C. Szepesvari, “Learning with
adversary,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.03034, 2015.
[9] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami, “Distillation
as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.04508, 2015.
[10] S. Gu and L. Rigazio, “Towards deep neural network architectures robust
to adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.5068, 2014.
[11] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex optimization. Cambridge
university press, 2004.
[12] Y. LeCun, C. Cortes, and C. J. Burges, “The mnist database of
handwritten digits,” 1998.
[13] P. Sermanet, D. Eigen, X. Zhang, M. Mathieu, R. Fergus, and Y. Le-
Cun, “Overfeat: Integrated recognition, localization and detection using
convolutional networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6229, 2013.
[14] J. Nocedal and S. Wright, Numerical optimization. Springer Science
& Business Media, 2006.
[15] C. Zhu, R. H. Byrd, P. Lu, and J. Nocedal, “Algorithm 778: L-bfgs-
b: Fortran subroutines for large-scale bound-constrained optimization,”
ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS), vol. 23, no. 4,
pp. 550–560, 1997.
[16] R. Collobert, K. Kavukcuoglu, and C. Farabet, “Torch7: A matlab-like
environment for machine learning,” in BigLearn, NIPS Workshop, no.
EPFL-CONF-192376, 2011.
[17] A. K. Kaw, E. K. Kalu, and D. Nguyen, “Numerical methods with
applications,” 2009.
[18] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-Fei, “Imagenet:
A large-scale hierarchical image database,” in Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 2009. CVPR 2009. IEEE Conference on. IEEE,
2009, pp. 248–255.
[19] Y. Bengio, “Learning deep architectures for ai,” Foundations and
trends R© in Machine Learning, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–127, 2009.
[20] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, 2012, pp. 1097–1105.
